The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine by Daria Platonova

Author:Daria Platonova [Platonova, Daria]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Nonfiction, Social & Cultural Studies, Social Science, Cultural Studies, Ethnic Studies
ISBN: 9781000453263
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2021-09-27T04:00:00+00:00

Actual acquaintance, elite survival and elite learning

Diffused patronage

Owing to the national and region-specific structural constraints described above, in diffused patronage regions, local elites from competing networks are involved in dense interactions with each other and with their patrons in the centre. Through the iterative processes of conflict, the elites learn how to make their actual acquaintance with the members of competing networks and those from their preferred network work to their advantage. More specifically, they learn how to negotiate with the members of rival networks and how to use the resources of their preferred networks distributed across the political system, especially in the judiciary. Actual acquaintance and dense interactions with the members of rival networks and their own network act as “safeguards” protecting these elites’ hold on power. Thus, ongoing conflicts among the members of competing networks become a type of investment, which helps the elites acquire knowledge of what rival networks prefer and build resilience to ensure their own survival under any network. In Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s terms, ongoing conflicts create certain cognitive expectations about the behaviour of the members of their rival networks, which are useful for the elites in the long-term in that, if a challenge comes from the rival network again, the elites know what to expect. This explains why certain elites in diffused patronage regions became well versed in law, compared to their counterparts in the concentrated patronage regions, and why they opted for united and integral Ukraine in spring 2014. In addition, some local elites can be targeted by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ministry of the Interior. These elites would manipulate the local courts and the loopholes in the judiciary system to settle their scores with the SBU and the Ministry. The centre in Kyiv is heavily involved in resolving all of these conflicts, which makes information flows between the centre and the region more transparent.

In the classic diffused patronage city of Kharkiv, ideological and commercial conflicts permeated local politics throughout the period of the divided-executive, only subsiding under one chief executive of Yanukovych. In many cases, the line between a commercial and a political conflict was extremely blurry because the key actors, such as the governor Arsen Avakov, city council secretary and later Kharkiv city mayor Hennadiy Kernes and Kharkiv city mayor and later governor Mykhailo Dobkin, had strong commercial interests in the region, being simultaneously owners of banks, firms and land at various points in their careers. Some individual members of the local elites were continuously embroiled in conflict. For people like Hennadiy Kernes (the Party of Regions’ member since 2006), who became the key political actor during the events of 2013–2014, not a month passed without a challenge in the years prior to Yanukovych becoming president. He was continuously exposed to the allegations of either spreading libel, being connected to the city’s criminal networks or destroying buildings unlawfully.189 In 2006–2007, Kernes faced assassination attempts on his home turf.190 The fact that Kernes was able to survive all of this illustrates that he was building resilience to survive under any network.

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